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The Politics of Ecumenical Disunity: 
The Troubled Marriage of Church World Service
and the National Council of Churches
 
Jill K. Gill
 
The fifty-year marriage between Church World Service (CWS)
and the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (NCC)
did not survive. In 2000, when they divorced to create separate
501(c)(3) organizations, CWS pleaded irreconcilable differences. The
fact that two of America’s most prominent mainline ecumenical orga-
nizations, committed to Christian unity, were unable to maintain a
healthy organizational marriage bears examination. Many people be-
came aware of their troubles in the late 1990s when their financial
arguments caught the attention of religious news services and period-
icals such as 
 
The Christian Century.
 
 Few are aware, however, that the
issues that caused their separation can be traced back nearly forty
years when fault lines appeared amid their approaches to the Viet-
nam War. This essay will examine those fault lines and trace how their
politicization transformed them into insurmountable rifts. The story
reveals how profoundly American political culture affects religious
life and work.
Few also know that the recent split between the NCC and its
relief and development arm is only the most recent example of a glo-
bal trend. Councils of churches and their service organizations have
been divorcing at record rates in recent years, and Australia’s may be
the next to do so.
 
1
 
 The World Council of Churches (WCC) is quick to
warn observers that councils of churches in different countries are
unique, and one must resist the temptation to extrapolate the prob-
lems faced by one onto others. Yet, a series of case studies on these
divorces could be beneficial to those seeking to diagnose this particu-
lar global aspect of ecumenical disunity as ecumenical organizations
everywhere struggle to adapt themselves to a new era. This essay
serves as one piece of that puzzle. As John McCullough, executive di-
rector of CWS, asserts, what happens in American ecumenical circles
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has important ramifications within the movement internationally, for
even in its transitional state, American ecumenism serves as the “super-
power” within the global ecumenical family.
 
2
 
 Conciliar ecumenical
organizations around the world are facing major financial challenges
that are inspiring a redefinition of their identities and core functions.
Even the survival of the World Council of Churches is in jeopardy.
The eyes of these organizations are on CWS and the NCC, for the out-
come of their efforts to redefine themselves and their relationship will
affect the future of ecumenism both within and beyond America’s
borders.
Due to the fact that media stories about the NCC’s and CWS’s
troubles have focused on recent financial matters, many people as-
sume that their divorce was precipitated primarily by these. The
causes are, however, much more complex. An examination of their
rocky relationship within a broader historical context reveals that fi-
nancial stress points have long been rooted in constituent and struc-
tural differences that became especially problematic during politically
polarized eras. (By “constituencies,” I refer to the subgroups or popu-
lations that these two organizations most desired to please and from
which they drew funds.) Throughout its history, CWS has maintained
close friendly ties with white middle-class suburbanites spanning the
theological spectrum and with the U.S. government; both provided it
with direct funds necessary for its relief work around the world.
Maintaining their goodwill has netted CWS considerable resources
for its mission but has also required it to be cautious in protecting and
packaging its image in ways inoffensive to these constituents. Since
the mid-1960s, the NCC’s constituent focus shifted more strongly to-
ward being an advocate for marginalized oppressed persons within
the socio-political sphere. This focus put it at odds frequently with
both government and moderate-to-conservative white parishioners
who tended to support CWS. The NCC’s sense of constituency also
included the leaders of its member denominations who advocated
for social justice, even when their laity did not, and who funneled de-
nominational monies to the council with the expectation that it
“speak truth to power.”
 
3
 
 The NCC’s hierarchical funding structure
that draws money from heads of churches, not the more conservative
grassroots, insulates it from the feelings of parishioners. This gives it
freedom to be prophetic (i.e., adversarial) on controversial issues, but
it may have also deafened it to valid criticism and alternative voices.
Place these basic constituent and structural differences into the politi-
cally charged environments of the Vietnam War and Reagan eras, as
well as into the context of declining mainline wealth, and one can wit-
ness the tug-of-war for image control, financial survival, and credibility
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that frayed the ties binding CWS and the NCC; these finally snapped
during the budget crises of the 1990s.
Both organizations were rooted in a liberal ecumenical tradi-
tion that believed that the body of Christ should be able to transcend
theological differences and worldly self-interests to unite for the ser-
vice of humankind. Their story reminds us, however, that religious
organizations cannot easily transcend the political culture of their
times nor the self interests of their constituents if they wish to survive
as organizations. Awareness of this reality is playing a role in the cur-
rent experimental reshaping of national ecumenical organizations in
the United States.
The revealing saga of the CWS/NCC relationship unfolded
in five stages. During the honeymoon period, both shared a sense of
constituency. The honeymoon ended during the volatile Vietnam era
when all of the fissures appeared that eventually fractured the mar-
riage. In the 1970s and 1980s, amid a conservative backlash against
1960s trends, we see politics aggravate these fissures by fueling sur-
vivalist struggles over image, money and organizational control. In
the 1990s, four situations, including financial chaos, became the cata-
lysts for a phased divorce beginning in 2000. Today, with separation
still in process, we see both organizations reconceptualizing them-
selves as part of an experimental, more multicentered ecumenical
world that is clearly different from the models of ecumenism popular-
ized at their births.
 
The Honeymoon Period (1950–1965)
 
CWS and the NCC shared a sense of constituency before the
mid-1960s. Church World Service has been one of America’s most suc-
cessful and ecumenically popular missions organizations. Founded in
1946 to meet the relief needs of European and Asian refugees after
World War II, the 
 
New York Times
 
 dubbed CWS “the largest private
agency distributing foreign relief.”
 
4
 
 In 1950, during a cultural period
that emphasized unity and conformity on many fronts, and in a wave
of bureaucracy-building, it joined the NCC as its overseas relief arm.
 
5
 
The council’s massive “umbrella” bureaucracy reflected the prevail-
ing ecumenical ideal of that era; it consolidated a nation’s denomina-
tional resources within a single network to avoid project duplication,
empower the church’s voice, and facilitate oneness in Christ. In the
1950s and early 1960s, both the NCC and CWS maintained coopera-
tive, mutually useful relationships with the U.S. government and saw
the mainline, suburban, white middle class as their core constituency.
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From the beginning of its existence, Church World Service worked
hand in hand with the State Department in distributing relief and re-
settling refugees around the world. Likewise, the Federal Council
of Churches, the NCC’s predecessor, worked with the government
during both world wars to advocate labor legislation and in the cre-
ation of the United Nations. The NCC continued this cooperation in
giving general support to the cold war, Kennedy’s test ban treaty,
and civil rights legislation.
 
6
 
 Recognizing that the council’s member
denominations gave it access to roughly forty million Americans, top
government officials attentively wooed council support. The NCC
was proud of its influential place and inside connections within the
establishment.
With regard to foreign governments, CWS had an operational
policy of political neutrality—basically of keeping politics out of its
work when distributing charity. Its top priority was to get food and
supplies to the needy regardless of political or religious affiliations,
and it was willing to work with all sorts of governments—the oppres-
sive, the corrupt, and the free—to do so. Criticizing governments or
refusing their aid impeded life-saving relief work. However, some no-
ticed that there was one sort of government with which CWS rarely
worked: that was any the U.S. government felt stood on the wrong
side of the cold war. To CWS in the early 1960s, this choice was not
viewed as overtly “political” per se, just practical. After all, a gener-
ous amount of relief supplies came from the U.S. government and
with certain strings attached. Significant support also came from pa-
triotic church people who felt either that America’s cold war efforts
were grounded in Christian, freedom-loving values, or who simply
felt that churches should focus on charity and leave political matters
to the experts. Since these two constituencies were critical to its work,
CWS was sensitive to them. The NCC had been as well.
But the Vietnam War, and rise of a revolutionary third world,
changed perceptions within the NCC, and particularly within its in-
creasingly influential social justice wing. In the nine years between
1965 and 1974, the National Council of Churches awakened to what it
considered to be its complicity in Western imperialism.
 
7
 
 It opened its
ears to the voices of the third world on foreign policy, and it embraced
for itself a bold prophetic role that would stand against America’s glo-
balism and civil religion when these threatened peace with justice.
The NCC’s shift in constituent priority to those fighting oppression
and inequality, and to building ecumenical bridges with such people
in the third world, affected the future directions of both the NCC and
CWS, as well as fueled the image, identity, and financial concerns that
eventually drove them apart.
 The Politics of Ecumenical Disunity
 
179
 
Fractures Appear: The Vietnam Era (1965–1975)
 
In the summer of 1965, when the NCC was still celebrating its
victorious partnership with government in the passage of civil rights
legislation, it suddenly found itself sharply criticized in ecumenical
journals for its passive accommodation of the government’s Vietnam
policy. In a joint editorial, the 
 
Christian Century
 
 and 
 
Christianity and
Crisis
 
 lambasted the council’s lack of ecumenical leadership and pro-
phetic backbone in facing the Vietnam War after having been so effec-
tive on civil rights.
 
8
 
 Two weeks later, a team of Japanese Christians
visited the council to share its concerns about the skewed and danger-
ous anticommunist, anti-China foundation of fear that undergirded
American foreign policy in Asia. The Japanese Peace Mission, as they
were called, made it clear to council leaders that Americans did not
understand the Asian mind on issues surrounding the war. Nor did
they understand the facts of the conflict because their fear and pre-
suppositions about Asia blinded them to alternative viewpoints.
 
9
 
 So
too did their allegiance to a nationalistic expression of Christianity.
American Protestant leaders were not used to listening to
Asian Christians on issues of U.S. foreign policy or faith. Even for lib-
erals with social justice orientations, this was a relatively new experi-
ence. But the complexities of the Vietnam War daunted, confused, and
concerned America’s top church leaders. Therefore, in seeking to de-
velop a Christian witness on the war, the National Council of Churches
solicited Asian opinions and insights on American foreign policy as
well as on the church’s role in relation to it. Asians were invited to
minister to and enlighten their American brethren. By doing so, they
helped to transform not only the council’s understanding of U.S. Viet-
nam policy but also its understanding of itself in relation to govern-
ment and to third world Christians overseas.
Through the Japanese Peace Mission and the council’s con-
tacts with another Asian body called the East Asia Christian Confer-
ence,
 
10
 
 it became clear that this perceived lack of understanding Asian
perspectives was fueling tensions not only between the United States
and non-Western nations but also between American Christians and
those in third world countries. For church leaders who had marched
recently with Martin Luther King, Jr., and who were witnessing the
growing dominance of third world voices in the World Council of
Churches, this charge of American ignorance of nonwhite perspec-
tives, and hence of deeper truths, struck a chord. Therefore, as the
council prepared to respond to the challenge of ecumenical leader-
ship on Vietnam, it made a priority of gathering information not only
from its friends in the U.S. State Department but also from various
Asian sources.
 
11
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The council was committed to making an independent pro-
phetic witness on Vietnam. Therefore, it empowered its international
affairs experts to study the issue and make recommendations for pol-
icy and action. By drawing from a variety of non-Western, particu-
larly Asian sources, including the impressions of American visitors to
Vietnam, two things became apparent. First, dissonance did exist be-
tween President Johnson’s stated objectives in Vietnam and America’s
militaristic actions there, something that the NCC emphasized in its
growing protests of U.S. policy.
 
12
 
 Second, there seemed to be a suspi-
cious credibility gap within the broader council itself as it struggled to
face issues raised by the war. The inconsistency appeared between the
stated intent of its International Affairs Commission to make a pro-
phetic “God before nation” Christian witness on Vietnam and the na-
tionalistic biases implied in the traditional overseas relief work of
Church World Service. This also illuminated anew the old factions
within Protestant Christianity between those that emphasized a social
gospel based in transformative social justice and those that empha-
sized apolitical service (i.e., charity and relief) in Christian expression.
The International Affairs Commission and the Commission
on Religion and Race together comprised the council’s largest and
loudest “liberation,” “peace with justice” coalition. Both were lodged
in its most socially and politically active Division of Christian Life
and Mission (DCLM).
 
13
 
 As stated above, the council had enjoyed a long-
standing record of partnership with big government. But throughout
the 1950s and into the early 1960s, both of these commissions had
grown gradually bolder in questioning government policies. They
challenged the wisdom of isolating Red China and denying civil
rights to black Americans. Through the example of Martin Luther
King, Jr., they saw prophetic Christian leadership on behalf of justice
as essential work of the church in the world.
 
14
 
 Due to the NCC’s
stands and the growing political activism of its social justice wing, the
council drew considerable criticism from parishioners for its sup-
posed revolutionary, communist-tainted sympathies.
 
15
 
 Its moderate
stances on Red China and active civil rights work also set expecta-
tions within liberal mainline leadership circles that the council should
lead its churches into joining the chorus of academics challenging
America’s Vietnam policy.
 
16
 
 In fact, council staff felt that denomina-
tional executives expected the council to move ahead of its member-
ship on controversial issues, to absorb the initial public criticism, and
thereby help create a precedent of opinion in which churches could
follow once their parishioners had been educated.
 
17
 
In the summer of 1965, shortly after the Japanese peace team
departed, Norman Baugher, vice president of the council’s DCLM,
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echoed the thoughts of several staff members when he stated the
following.
 
It seems imperative to me that the Christian Church speak as
prophetically regarding the international situation generally
and war specifically as it did with regard to the civil rights situ-
ation in the United States. From our discussions in meeting with
the Japanese delegation, I must say that I am distressed with the
strong pressures to make the church simply a supportive influ-
ence of U.S.A. foreign policy.
 
In his next comment, however, Baugher alerted his colleagues to the
fact that a prophetic verbal witness on Vietnam would hold little
weight with the rest of the world if the church’s image was still tied to
U.S. foreign policy and interests.
 
Judging from the comments of the Japanese delegation . . . [ as
well as] from our own contacts, . . . it must be imperative for the
Christian Church of the West to have an image in Southeast
Asia other than that which is represented by U.S.A. foreign pol-
icy and the presence of military personnel in that area of the
world. If we cannot manifest a different image, the Christian
Church is simply irrelevant to the people of that area.
 
18
 
The image of Christianity in the world, and particularly in Asia, was
still being identified with the imperialistic intentions of the West. This
was sabotaging ecumenical relationships with the international body
of Christ. If the NCC wanted to win the trust of Asians and other
non-Western Christians in the pursuit of ecumenical unity, Baugher
emphasized, it had to change the Church’s old image of being a
government lackey and partner in nation-building efforts.
The Reverend Harold Row, from the Church of the Brethren,
soon validated Baugher’s conclusions. He was sent to Southeast Asia
under the auspices of the NCC to investigate issues raised by the Jap-
anese visitors. Row returned not only highly critical of U.S. military
policy in Vietnam but also with an emergency message for the coun-
cil: the American churches’ image problem in Asia was not only seri-
ous, but it also aggravated the worldwide ecumenical rift between
“third world” churches generally and those affiliated with the West.
 
The American church’s compassionate ministries in Asia are in
grave danger of being grossly misinterpreted and even rejected
by Asian churches because of the close tie-in with American
military and foreign aid policies. There is a tragic United States
prostitution of humanitarian impulses and services because of
the total involvement of the U.S. government militarily, politi-
cally, and in maintaining its own gigantic relief and reconstruction
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efforts in South Vietnam. . . . This is the great immorality—that
we use the humanitarian motive, the compassionate heart, to
make more palatable the hard-core military operation. This is
the critical danger to the cause represented by the churches.
 
19
 
Row added that Willem Visser ‘t Hooft, General Secretary of the
World Council of Churches, also voiced deep concern about the grow-
ing rift between Asian and American Christians and its negative re-
percussions for world ecumenism.
 
20
 
 Angry ecumenical representa-
tives from the developing world were gaining rapid influence within
the WCC, and the NCC began to pay heed. The council’s sense of
its ecumenical constituency, as well as to whom the credibility of its
image was tied, was shifting from the American white mainline pop-
ulation and government to politicized persons of color, both domesti-
cally and overseas. Liberal denominational executives, who channeled
funds to the NCC, encouraged this shift. Dean Kelley, a longtime
NCC staff associate for religious and civil liberty, said that, “as long as
they [the denominations] are willing to pay the bills, we can take the
heat.”
 
21
 
In early 1966, the NCC recruited Robert Bilheimer to serve as
director of its International Affairs Commission. Bilheimer came
ready to lead the council in a listening ministry of third world voices
as well as in a prophetic stance against injustices perpetrated by
American foreign policies.
 
22
 
 His ultimate goal was to inspire the NCC
to set an ecumenical “confessing church” example on Vietnam that re-
quired it to stand apart from the state in moral witness rather than
serve as a blind religious justifier of its policies.
 
23
 
 Certain staff mem-
bers within the council’s missions wing, particularly Church World
Service, were not yet similarly inclined, and for very practical reasons.
Church World Service, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, was reg-
istered with the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Volun-
tary Foreign Aid. Since the 1950s, CWS had become a major distribu-
tor of government-supplied relief aid around the world. In fact, it
played a role in drafting what eventually became Public Law 480
(1954) which made surplus food available for voluntary agencies to
distribute in relief efforts overseas.
 
24
 
 It then worked in direct partner-
ship with the State Department’s Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) in its “Food for Freedom” program (also called “Food
For Peace”) which, according to CWS director James MacCracken,
aimed “to utilize current United States harvests in overseas nation-
building efforts.”
 
25
 
In January 1966, with the creation of Vietnam Christian Ser-
vice (VNCS), Church World Service joined the “Food for Peace” pro-
gram in South Vietnam. CWS created VNCS in conjunction with
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Lutheran World Relief and the Mennonite Central Committee to take
advantage of shared resources and the Mennonites’ established net-
work and organization in Vietnam.
 
26
 
 The goal of CWS in creating Viet-
nam Christian Service was to alleviate suffering and be a Christian
presence in that war-torn land. But it also meant that, in Vietnam,
Church World Service was operating (inadvertently or not) in con-
junction with U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to win the hearts and
minds of Vietnam’s peasants.
 
27
 
 Several internal State Department
documents spanning the length of the war made mandatory a coordi-
nated link between “Food for Peace” relief efforts in South Vietnam
dispensed by voluntary agencies and the government’s pacification
program.
 
28
 
 The following comment from a 1970 USAID report serves
as one example. “Starting in 1965, as the US participation in the war
effort in Viet Nam piled up momentum, there was U.S. Mission accep-
tance of the premise that Title II food [PL 480] was one of the re-
sources to be used in the massive U.S. support of South Vietnam’s
counterinsurgency and pacification effort.”
 
29
 
 In spite of this church-
state connection, MacCracken defended the nonpartisan stance of CWS
charity, saying that it simply dispensed aid where it was needed with-
out meddling in politics and that, in Vietnam, CWS was forced to
work within limits set by the U.S. government if food was to get in.
 
30
 
True, but critics noted that dependence upon government for
goods and transportation costs, for new program approval, and for
logistics support did tie Christian charities to the goals of the state.
 
31
 
During the war years, while the council’s international affairs team
was joining its voice with that of the antiwar movement, Church
World Service was helping the South Vietnamese government to re-
patriate its refugees and feed them primarily within the pacification
program.
 
32
 
 The U.S. government also banned PL 480 commodities
from any nation that traded with North Vietnam or Cuba.
 
33
 
 This
clearly exposed the political intentions behind the government’s pro-
gram and implicated CWS in its cold war mission. Gerhard Elston,
the Vietnam specialist within the NCC’s International Affairs Com-
mission, saw the “Food for Peace” relief activities as helping provide
the U.S. government with public relations cover to mask the real de-
structiveness of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
 
34
 
 It should be noted that, un-
like Catholic Relief Services, MacCracken insisted that no CWS relief
supplies be channeled as payment to South Vietnamese troops.
 
35
 
 Never-
theless, the National Council of Churches had to face its own public
credibility gap between the rising antiwar messages drafted by its
social justice wing and the appearance of nation-building “hearts
and minds” work being accomplished through Church World Ser-
vice. This mixed message was fueling tensions between the NCC and
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churches overseas, not to mention causing nonwhite persons within
ecumenical circles to question the NCC’s words as disingenuous.
Compounding these tensions were their different approaches
to and assumptions about the role that the churches might play in
postwar Vietnam. Church World Service launched a “Commission on
Tomorrow’s Vietnam” to plan how the churches would aid in rebuild-
ing Vietnam after the war. It was clear to the international affairs staffers,
who were asked to join the commission, that CWS shared certain gov-
ernment assumptions. For example, they assumed that the United
States would eventually have its way in Vietnam, that North Vietnam
would collapse under U.S. punishment, and that the United States
and its churches would then be invited in to help pick up the pieces
just as they had done in damaged nations after World War II. CWS
planned to partner closely with the government in this work.
 
36
 
 In con-
trast, the international affairs team raised doubts about whether the
United States could achieve military victory or that the Vietnamese
would automatically welcome the postwar interference of U.S. in-
stitutions in their country.
 
37
 
 Robert Bilheimer categorized CWS’s
approach to postwar planning under MacCracken as “humanitarian
imperialism” and added that it gave him “the cold chills.”
 
38
 
Financial differences also aggravated competitive tension be-
tween Church World Service and the social justice wing of the Na-
tional Council of Churches and would for decades.
 
39
 
 Whereas the so-
cial justice wing was the most publicly unpopular, highly criticized
branch of the council, Church World Service was a favorite of the
grassroots.
 
40
 
 Many a parishioner who found the social justice side of
the council suspect, distasteful, and perhaps a little “pink” continued
to support the council because, by the mid-1960s, overseas missions
received more than 50 percent of its annual budget compared to the
small fraction dedicated to social issues.
 
41
 
 Within the NCC structure,
Church World Service enjoyed the unique privilege of being able to
solicit direct funds from parishioners, which it did with great success.
Its two best fundraisers, the “CROP Walk” and “One Great Hour of
Sharing,” still attract generous donations from individuals represent-
ing a broad spectrum of theological beliefs. Most important, fundrais-
ing tied its awareness to grassroots opinion in a way not shared by
other council departments that received budgeted monies from de-
nominational bureaucracies, not directly from the masses.
 
42
 
 Some so-
cial action people within the NCC resented these private donations,
saying that donating to relief agencies like CWS simply gave local
Christians an easy “out” or a conscience-salving excuse not to deal with
the root causes of human suffering.
 
43
 
 CWS attributed these criticisms
to jealousy of its considerable financial resources and public goodwill.
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Over the first few years of the war, the council’s international
affairs team helped lead the council at large firmly onto the antiwar
side of the Vietnam debate while Church World Service approached
war-induced problems using traditional, less critical, U.S. govern-
ment supported strategies. Council leaders were aware of this confus-
ing dichotomy, but they showed considerable public tolerance for it,
probably because few other options existed for providing massively
needed aid to the suffering in Vietnam and because Church World
Service enjoyed such widespread grassroots support. Church World Ser-
vice also came in handy as an image-booster whenever the NCC was
criticized for focusing too heavily on radical political causes rather
than on what many laypersons considered real church work. The
council’s executive staff could point to Church World Service and its
generous share of the budget as proof that conservative critics over-
exaggerated its political activities.
 
44
 
 While the NCC saw CWS as a
benefit to its image, at least with the grassroots (and used it as such),
CWS would experience the NCC as a detriment to its image as Amer-
ica’s political culture grew more conservative in succeeding decades.
In spite of the council’s public tolerance, social justice person-
nel pressed service leaders to change their presuppositions and
methods in dealing with Vietnam, and they experienced slow, mea-
sured success. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a concerted decline
in Church World Service’s use of surplus government foodstuffs
overseas and an increased effort to source more supplies from church
donations, even though these were less plentiful and more costly.
 
45
 
During that same period, one can note a change in Church World
Service’s planned approach for rebuilding Vietnam reflected in its
postwar rebuilding program (Commission on Tomorrow’s Vietnam). It
gradually evolved from being a typical World War II-styled, American-
driven program to one that was willing to let indigenous groups direct
rebuilding efforts.
 
46
 
Several other factors within the NCC, VNCS, and the nation
at large may have influenced these developments in CWS. In 1965,
CWS became a department within the NCC’s Division of Overseas
Missions (DOM). According to former CWS Associate Director, Rob-
ert Stenning, the DOM itself was split. Some favored a missions focus
that included an immediate emphasis on “development” (i.e., analyz-
ing the root causes of problems, making systemic changes, and doing
political advocacy). Others favored a “relief” approach that fed people
first, no questions asked, and let development efforts emerge slowly
out of the feeding programs after the crises of need had subsided.
 
47
 
 As
a result of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, the NCC’s
sense of religious mission became more oriented toward social action.
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This inspired DOM leaders to move in that direction by the early
1970s. So too did the rising number of DOM staff members who en-
tered the NCC with Latin American missions experience as liberation
theology was budding there. A similar split was emerging among
VNCS fieldworkers. By 1967, growing resentment at the U.S. govern-
ment’s use of voluntary agencies to further its military objectives had
sparked protest among some young service-minded volunteers in Viet-
nam. Even though VNCS leaders quelled the upstarts and smoothed
relations with the government, the issue grew more divisive as the
war continued to sour.
 
48
 
 Contributing as well to Church World Ser-
vice’s decision to reduce government aid may have been several
events that fueled the general suspicion of government operations.
These included the credibility gap revealed by the Tet Offensive, me-
dia exposure of rampant corruption within the South Vietnamese
government, and the uncovering of secret CIA funding of certain stu-
dent and religious organizations.
As the NCC became more driven by social justice issues,
MacCracken budged under pressure but not by conviction. He was not
interested in reforming CWS’s traditional philosophy or methods.
 
49
 
MacCracken had bundled his many years of relief work routinely
with America’s cold war objectives. Before coming to CWS, he had
managed the Tolstoy Foundation, which combined humanitarianism
and anticommunism. Then, in his first major assignment with Church
World Service, he had organized “Flights for Freedom,” which shuttled
Cubans out of Castro’s country in the early 1960s entirely on the U.S.
government’s dollar.
 
50
 
 During the Vietnam War, MacCracken resisted
spreading the prophetic impulse to CWS. He maintained that CWS
should stick with its relief focus and not sabotage its effectiveness by
becoming overtly political in ways that bit the hands that fed it.
 
51
 
Supporters argued articulately that there was no other effective way
to distribute life-saving relief in such a politically polarized world.
 
52
 
Nevertheless, by time the United States began withdrawal
from Vietnam, the NCC had embraced an independent role for itself
that mandated the outright protest of governmental policies that ex-
ploited persons’ human rights. In 1973, even CWS approved a stra-
tegic council document that would make “matters of ‘justice and
liberation’” a consideration when providing relief.
 
53
 
 With regard to
Asia, the social justice and missions wings agreed: “There is a need
for sensitive, generous and respectful American response to the ef-
forts of the East Asian peoples to secure liberation in the determina-
tion of their own life-style and justice in their economic and social
development. This human need,” they confirmed, “overarches all
others.”
 
54
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These statements would articulate the united objective of the
council’s departments henceforth, even though the strategies of
Church World Service remained the subject of fierce debate.
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 While
the 1973 document was drafted under MacCracken’s leadership, it
was not applied with his blessing. In fact, in 1974, amid great contro-
versy, MacCracken was forced to resign his position for not imple-
menting that strategy in the manner desired by his superiors.
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 His
dismissal sparked anger within the ranks of CWS and became a proof
point for conservative Christians who claimed that the council had
been taken over by Marxist-loving revolutionaries. The controversy
worsened when, shortly thereafter, the 
 
Christian Century
 
 published a
slanted but thought-provoking article entitled “The Politics of Char-
ity,” which detailed how the cooperative ties between Church World
Service and the government did indeed bind that church agency to
the government’s questionable policies in Vietnam and elsewhere.
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Partnering with government to secure the free world, in a way that
largely assumed the goodness and superiority of American policies,
had been sharply rejected by leaders in the NCC. Pressures to make a
separate “confessing church” witness on the Vietnam War and the
council’s new focus on heeding the voices of the oppressed, even over
the voices of their own government and parishioners, had compelled
the council to face its own credibility gap between its words and
deeds and set the entire council on a human rights course.
MacCracken was replaced by Paul McCleary, a United Meth-
odist with Latin American missions experience. With him came en-
forcement of blending justice advocacy with relief aid. CWS even
opened an office on development policy in Washington, D.C., to edu-
cate government officials about food and hunger issues.
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 Develop-
ment and global education became part of CWS’s mandate. There-
fore, by 1974, the NCC’s social action wing had established hegemony
in terms of integrating a social justice focus into the life of the entire
council. Also, by the Vietnam War’s end, both the council’s social jus-
tice and missions wings were listening to “third world” voices in
ways that they had not before the war, recognizing their aspirations
for themselves as preeminent over what the American government or
church may prescribe. The NCC hoped that its new sensitivity to such
voices would build the council’s credibility with nonwhite peoples as
well as fulfill its prophetic directive to advance peace with justice. As
Edward Fiske of the 
 
New York Times
 
 noted, council “leaders who once
spent much of their time worrying about the loss of financial support
from conservatives on the right are now more worried about losing
touch with minorities on the left,” and they were willing to risk a
smaller budget to reach out to them.
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One might assume that CWS’s forced assimilation solved the
NCC’s image and credibility problems with CWS, as well as healed
the breach between them. This was not the case, for a shifting political
climate began to imperil the NCC in ways that would exacerbate its
financial, image-based, and constituency tensions with CWS. When
MacCracken left office, the NCC’s social justice wing, the DCLM, was
nearly defunct. It had alienated many of its grassroots and govern-
mental allies with what they viewed as its elitist, meddling, self-
righteous, overly politicized, unrepresentative postures on and methods
of addressing Vietnam, civil rights, and related issues.
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 As a conser-
vative tide swept over America in the late 1960s, denomination heads
who fed council coffers had their own purse strings tightened.
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 As a
result, many of the NCC’s member denominations began retrench-
ing.
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 By 1974, the council clearly stood on the wrong side of the con-
servative backlash sweeping American life even as it attempted to
stand on the right side of world revolutions.
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 In this sense, it sacri-
ficed positive relations with its own parishioners and government to
nurture them with peoples in the international ecumenical commu-
nity. It is important to remember that the NCC perceived being pro-
phetic on social justice issues as its mandate and duty deriving from
the expectations of denominational leaders affiliated with the NCC—
those who helped set NCC policy and facilitated its financial survival.
However, the result was an out-of-touch, elitist, radical image, a mas-
sive loss of funds, and severe staff and program cuts.
By 1974, the DCLM had been severely downsized, retooled,
and renamed the Division of Church and Society. In order to make it
more palatable to the grassroots, it reemphasized evangelism and
launched a ministry of listening to laity.
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 A conflict-weary and no
longer silent majority of American people, who felt abandoned and
ignored by their church bureaucrats, wanted their own voices made
central again.
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 This was part and parcel of the silent majority’s broader
resentment of northeastern, liberal, elite bureaucracies that apparently
listened to the screaming radicals rather than to them. The gutting and
financial losses of the DCLM was something from which MacCracken,
and CWS’s denominational board of overseers, had wanted to save
CWS by maintaining its more nonconfrontational popular ways.
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 Pri-
marily because it had the unique ability to raise its own grassroots
funds and because its reputation as a relief agency played well in the
pews, CWS survived the cuts of the 1970s in relatively good shape.
Due to this, it also remained tied and sensitive to the laity in ways that
other NCC departments did not.
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Nevertheless, the council’s negative radical image, as enforced
by its heightened focus on social justice, liberation, and political advo-
cacy, continued to threaten the council’s financial health in the conser-
vative Reagan years, and this had negative ramifications for CWS as
well. The NCC had an adversarial relationship with the Reagan White
House, particularly on foreign policy. Reagan also wooed leaders of
the New Christian Right while snubbing those of the liberal mainline.
However, Reagan was popular with mainline Protestant voters, espe-
cially early in his administration.
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In January 1983, the NCC received a double-barreled attack
from the conservative periodical Reader’s Digest (circulation 17.9 mil-
lion) and CBS’s hit television show “60 Minutes” (22.9 million house-
holds).68 In an article entitled “Do You Know Where Your Church
Offerings Go?” and a TV spot called “The Gospel According to Whom?”
the NCC was accused of funneling church offering plate donations to
Marxist causes and revolutionaries.69 They painted the NCC as antag-
onistic toward capitalism and biased in its selective condemnation of
human rights violations.70 Reader’s Digest mourned the fact that Mac-
Cracken, who “refused to re-orient the agency [CWS] from its tradi-
tional mission of helping the poor and hungry . . . was summarily
fired” and that “now CWS also engages in political advocacy, con-
tributing churchgoer funds to programs designed to further strategic
goals of governments with which CWS leaders sympathize.” The
stories said that “money from hunger appeals . . . is funding political
activists.” Quoting an informant, Reader’s Digest wrote, “People just
can’t believe that their church, the church they’ve loved all their
lives, can be financing all these Marxist-Leninist projects.” Another
informant accused the NCC of having “substituted revolution for
religion.”
The two stories captured national media attention. Time,
Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and the nation’s major news-
papers carried articles on them and the NCC’s rebuttal. Several jour-
nalists noticed that Reader’s Digest and “60 Minutes” based their
charges on information gathered largely from one neo-conservative
group highly critical of the NCC, the Institute on Religion and De-
mocracy.71 They also noted that the amount of money going to politi-
cal causes from the NCC was incredibly small (as mandated by its
501(c)(3) non-profit tax status) and that 70 percent of the NCC budget,
which went to CWS, was designated for service work and spent as
earmarked.72 But they recognized how the NCC’s image of political
liberalism put it out of favor with many local Christians and hence
threatened the organization’s financial health.73 Newsweek wrote, “In
its effort to be a voice for the voiceless, the NCC failed to listen to the
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complaints of its own white, middle-class supporters . . . concerns to
which conservative Christians so effectively speak.” It also described
the NCC as “less a tyrant than an ecclesiastical Gulliver, a lumbering
target for any Lilliputian group that dares to challenge its liberal polit-
ical bent.” Several articles faulted the NCC for its “romantic naiveté in
relating to revolutions in developing countries”74 and of perhaps re-
acting to the injustices exposed during the 1960s by swinging too far,
too blindly, in the appease-all-activists direction.
The NCC, as well as its supporters at the Christian Century, re-
butted the charges made by Reader’s Digest and “60 Minutes” and
rebuked their reporting as shallowly researched and slanted.75 Some
in the NCC saw the attacks as a blessing in disguise, for they pro-
vided the council with an opportunity to address its image problems
with the public. Others recognized that the charges hit the financially
weak council at a vulnerable time, injuring it further.76 The ramifica-
tions of these two articles aggravated stress points between CWS and
the NCC as CWS saw its ties with the council create a credibility gap
with its constituents.
In 1984, the NCC hired a new general secretary, Arie Brouwer,
who had worked previously in the social justice wing of the World
Council of Churches; also in 1984, CWS named a new executive direc-
tor, J. Richard Butler, who had risen through CWS ranks.77 Brouwer
inherited a directive from the NCC’s governing board to integrate
Church World Service and other departments, in identity and fi-
nances, more tightly under centralized NCC management oversight.78
The expressed goals were to create a more unified ecumenical organi-
zation, reduce the “turf-driven culture” of the NCC, and keep closer
tabs on programs and budgets in these difficult times.79 One of the re-
percussions of integration involved charging integrated offices a
“common services assessment” to help finance shared NCC services
that benefited each department. Because Church World Service now
brought in and spent between 70 and 80 percent of the NCC’s total
budget, CWS complained that it was charged an excessive assessment
fee—a fee that was subsidizing other NCC programs as well as “com-
mon services” that CWS could perform for itself.80 Exacerbating the
problem was the fact that, by the late 1980s, CWS had hit its own fi-
nancial crisis. Contributions drawn by CWS had remained flat for
several years while expenses and salaries had climbed.81
In 1987, Brouwer threatened to fire CWS director, Richard
Butler, for dragging his feet in completing the integration process.82
Brouwer attributed CWS’s reluctance to its unwillingness to share its
bounty and be a team player for the good of the whole organization.
He was especially angry that CWS avoided using the NCC label in its
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fundraising television ads because CWS’s popular service image could
help the council. Of course, CWS sought image distance and fought
further integration in order to preserve that popularity. CWS feared
that local people, who had been loyal contributors to its relief pro-
grams, would refuse to give if they thought that their money might be
fed into one of the NCC’s supposedly radical red-tinted programs.
Bottom line, further blending of the NCC and CWS might scare off
CWS’s more conservative patrons. It feared also that levying large
common assessment taxes on CWS was dishonest to its donors, who
had given those funds for relief only. In fact, CWS said that some de-
nominations had begun funneling their relief dollars into other agen-
cies to avoid the NCC’s large overhead tax. CWS became more ner-
vous when the United Methodists and the Episcopalians created their
own private relief agencies.83 In this politically polarized era, domi-
nated by conservative sentiments and shrinking mainline finances,
the NCC’s and CWS’s different constituencies, structures, and foci
created contradictory needs. Whereas the NCC needed CWS’s popu-
lar image and resources, CWS wanted to evade the NCC’s adversarial
liberal image and money demands.
A long-simmering power struggle surfaced and exploded.
With a budget and staff that dwarfed the combined rest of the council,
many in CWS resented being controlled and, to them, financially used
by a now desperate, shrinking council. The NCC was the parent
body; nevertheless, because of the size difference, one writer likened
the situation to the tail (NCC) wagging the dog (CWS).84 So, when
Brouwer asked Butler to resign, Butler refused and received the
“unanimous endorsement of the CWS Unit Committee,” a group of
denominational executives whose communions funded and shaped
policy for CWS.85 The NCC quickly created a committee to adjudicate
the Brouwer-Butler dispute. Nevertheless, in June 1988, Butler sud-
denly quit, citing that Brouwer demeaned CWS in written communi-
cations and that his integration plan placed too much power in “too
few hands.”86 Feeling that Butler had been driven out, an angry CWS
committee then asked to have Brouwer’s leadership ability assessed,
to which Brouwer responded in a vitriolic speech.87 Finally, in Decem-
ber, CWS requested a divorce from the NCC.88 To solve the dispute
with CWS, which was the only department big enough to block
Council directives, another NCC committee recommended that the
NCC delay further integration plans.89 After a contentious NCC board
meeting at which Brouwer failed to receive a solid vote of confidence,
Brouwer himself resigned (1989), bringing the personnel aspect of
the crisis to a close. With Brouwer out, and integration plans halted,
CWS continued with the council. However, the politically tied, image-
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based, costly points of conflict between CWS and the NCC remained
unresolved and their futures troubled.90
Between 1975 and 1987, the NCC’s budget had dropped in
value by 53 percent. Its staff size was also decimated; in 1968, it
boasted 187 elected staffpersons and, by 1989, only 61.91 Therefore, in
1990, the NCC restructured itself again. In a move that noted the pop-
ularity and fundraising power of CWS relative to its other depart-
ments, the NCC melded some vestiges of its International Affairs
Commission and development-oriented Division of Overseas Mis-
sions into Church World Service, creating a new NCC unit called
“Church World Service and Witness.”92 The new name became a point
of contention because “witness” connoted politicized advocacy work
that CWS did not want attached to it so prominently. So Church
World Service chose to call itself “CWS/CROP” in its correspondence
with supporters while the NCC used “Church World Service and Wit-
ness” in its mailings.93 The restructuring put CWS in the new unit’s
driver’s seat and recognized that CWS (while charged with embrac-
ing social justice goals) had strength because its mission was clear
and its service work resonated well with a more traditionally minded
public. The rest of the council was still trying, as William McKinney
wrote, “to ask what God is calling post-establishment churches to be
about in a culture that no longer takes us as seriously as we take our-
selves.” McKinney hypothesized that the NCC’s brand of bureau-
cratic, liberal, ecumenical, activist, human-rights focused Protestant-
ism may no longer be in vogue.94 Some questioned whether this
expression of Christianity had ever been popular beyond the bureau-
cratic ranks and seminaries of the mainline denominations.95 One
former council staffer-turned-critic blamed the NCC’s decline on
“people with suicidal tendencies on the inside,” explaining that “the
triumph of their slogans is much more important to them than the sur-
vival of the organization they serve.”96
The Road to Separation and Divorce (1990s–2003)
The decade of the 1990s strained relations between CWS and
the NCC to the breaking point. Four situations converged to compel
CWS to seek divorce. The first, and most publicized, was the NCC’s
massive budget deficits that climbed to nearly $10 million and were,
in part, the result of poor fiscal management.97 CWS, which brought
in the vast majority of NCC funds, resented that the NCC controlled
them all. Its grassroots and denominational supporters had grown
steadily more mistrustful of how church hierarchies managed do-
nated funds, and, amid reports of financial crisis at the NCC, they
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demanded separation.98 The NCC, in its defense, contends that the
head of CWS signed off on all expenditures in the 1990s and that
CWS’s common services assessment merely reflected its fair share of
NCC overhead costs.99
Second, NCC General Secretary Joan Brown Campbell’s close
personal friendship with President and Mrs. Clinton, combined with
the NCC’s more liberal political stands, gave the appearance that it
was a partisan supporter of the Democratic Party. After twelve years
of being shut out by Republican administrations, the council took ad-
vantage of renewed access to the White House under President Clin-
ton. However, assumptions of council partisanship threatened CWS’s
ability to work constructively with future Republican administra-
tions. Indeed, the NCC’s sharp criticism of George W. Bush’s policies,
and Bush’s refusal to meet with council leaders, put CWS in a difficult
position. The U.S. government’s value as a constituent had grown.
(Government support comprised 25.3 percent of CWS’s budget in
1999 and 28 percent in 2002.)100 CWS had to be able to work with
every presidential administration, whether Democrat or Republican.101
The NCC’s love/hate rapport with presidents was not compatible
with CWS’s continuing need for outward political neutrality.
Third, in the late 1990s, after the position of CWS director had
become a revolving door of short-term tenures, new CWS Director
Rodney Page admitted to the heads of the NCC’s member denomina-
tions that the situation with the NCC had become unworkable. His
candor caught people’s attention. Leaders of mission programs within
member communions helped convince the denomination heads that
separation was necessary.102
Finally, in 2000, when Page retired, CWS was experiencing a
resurgence of financial health. Page had expanded CWS’s annual in-
come from $42 to $62 million in four years by increasing government
funds, foundation gifts, and grassroots donations.103 It was supplying
and utilizing 85 percent of the NCC’s budget (about $70 million out of
a total $77 million budget). Instead of making this increased funding
vulnerable to what appeared to be a sinking, mismanaged NCC, CWS
desired separation to protect it and the organization.
In 2000, the NCC granted CWS’s wish for independence by
freeing it financially from the council at large. This stopped the NCC
from laying common services taxes on CWS without its mutual agree-
ment. CWS said that it hoped financial separation from the NCC
would translate into greater “trust and transparency” with donors
who needed to feel confident that their money would be spent en-
tirely on CWS projects.104
The Reverend John McCullough, who took over as executive
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director in 2000, spearheaded the establishment of CWS’s own iden-
tity apart from that of the NCC. According to McCullough, CWS’s
name recognition and identity had slipped in the 1990s and was sub-
sumed by the NCC’s. Therefore, he set about recovering it by creating
a distinct new logo and Web site for CWS.105 Both were designed to
help market and position CWS as an organization in its own right, as
well as shape an image reflective of its grassroots’ priorities. One no-
tices on its Web site an intentional near-absence of references to the
NCC. Sections entitled “About CWS” and “History” contain no men-
tion of its fifty-year membership within the broader council. It states
only that it is “part of the ecumenical family of the National Council
of Churches” in fine print at the bottom of its home page. In contrast,
the NCC promotes CWS activities and news as prominently as ever.106
Its Web site and newsletter, Eculink, give few clues that CWS is no
longer part of the NCC. The NCC’s new general secretary, Robert
Edgar, has dedicated an entire section of Eculink (circulation 80,000) to
the work of CWS. This positive publicity is paid for entirely by the
NCC, which no doubt still benefits from a connection with the CWS
image. According to Edgar, however, CWS refuses to add Eculink to
its own mailing list because of its desire to keep association with the
NCC at arm’s length. The rationale given was that ties with the NCC
make it too difficult to raise funds.107
One look at letters to the highly conservative Presbyterian Lay-
man illustrates CWS’s success at separating its image from that of the
NCC. Comments such as the following are commonly found in con-
servative mainline circles:
Church World Service has been faithfully administering the con-
tributions entrusted to it by various individuals, congregations,
and denominations for many years, caring for the needs of
those in crisis. And the Lord has abundantly blessed them with
greater responsibility, as the size of their budget shows. The
NCC, on the other hand, has been foolishly squandering its
money on things that fail to bring Christ glory, furthering an
often political agenda at the expense of the proclamation of the
Gospel of Jesus Christ. And the Lord has removed His blessing
from the NCC.
Another writes, “I recommend that we leave the NCC and continue to
support Church World Service. I really don’t want us to give any
money to bail out [the] NCC.”108 Such comments also illustrate how
the laity tends to view the NCC and CWS in simplistic polarized
terms of “good guy” and “bad guy.”
Unbeknownst to laity is the fact that several of the NCC’s
official statements on recent political issues originated within the
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governance ranks of CWS. These include resolutions on Israel and
Palestine, Afghanistan, September 11th, and against the war in Iraq.109
While the NCC has tried to leverage CWS’s image to boost its own,
CWS in turn has used the NCC as a means through which to make
political statements without grassroots knowledge. Indeed, Executive
Director McCullough admitted that the leadership within CWS today
often has little disagreement with the NCC on its political stands.
The conflict derives, rather, from the NCC’s hierarchical pro-
cess and style of response, which is not conducive to CWS’s grassroots-
based structure. CWS sees the NCC as overly aggressive in its desire
to make a quick prophetic response to controversial issues, a response
that is generated by top NCC staff with little involvement invited of
others. It also dreads the NCC’s appearance of partisanship in its at-
tacks on Republican policies. This process and apparent partisanship
threatens to hurt CWS’s positive relationship both with its grassroots
and governmental constituencies. If CWS is ever going to join the
NCC visibly in confronting hot politicized issues, McCullough says
that the council’s process must become more consultive and reflective
of various layers within the body of Christ; its statements must also
be crafted in ways that avoid implicit partisanship. He admits that
CWS is a heavy, grassroots organization that cannot afford to jump
too far ahead of its constituencies nor alienate the White House; it is
because of these structural and financial linkages that Robert Edgar
calls CWS “genetically nice.” The NCC, however, sees jumping ahead
of the laity and alienating the White House as sometimes part of its
prophetic mission.
From the NCC’s perspective, its identity, strengths, and func-
tionality are invested in its ability to react quickly and prophetically
to political crises and then rally support behind council positions.
Since the 1960s, many within the NCC have perceived this as one of
its greatest (and most underappreciated) gifts to the ecumenical com-
munity.110 Its hierarchical structure that links its funding and survival
to denominational bureaucracies rather than parishioners provides it
this freedom. Becoming more reflective of laity as well as neutral with
government might muffle what it perceives as its prophetic voice.
Conversely, others have said that if the NCC continues to project its
own voice over that of parishioners, ignoring lay criticism, it cannot
and should not survive.
Its survival has indeed been raised with a question mark, es-
pecially during CWS’s departure in 2000. At that time, the NCC saw
its annual budget dwindled down to $7 million and its professional
staff cut to 47. Some feared it might fold. Yet, since the separation, the
NCC has also experienced a welcome rebirth. Under the leadership of
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a new general secretary, Robert Edgar, the NCC managed to balance
its budget. In 2002, armed with a generous grant from the Lilly En-
dowment for new program development, monetary assistance from
the United Methodist and Presbyterian churches, and tighter internal
oversight, the NCC appears to have turned an important financial
corner.111
The heads of its key member denominations continue to
deem the NCC’s work as essential to their ecumenical missions. Mc-
Cullough also recognizes the NCC’s existence as a necessary part of
American ecumenism. The NCC has admitted, however, that it needs
to broaden its constituency in order to survive as an ecumenically ef-
fective institution in a new era.112 Edgar has led the NCC into explor-
ing the expansion of its ecumenical table to include Roman Catholics,
Evangelicals, and Pentecostals.113 It is seeking ways to become more
relevant to and representative of all Christians in America, even as it
remains loyal to its prophetic advocacy work on behalf of social and
economic justice.114
Conservative churches have been disinclined to join anything
connected to the NCC. The council, therefore, has stepped back from
the process while helping its member denominations take the lead
in creating a new ecumenical organization called Christian Churches
Together (CCT) that functions as “a larger table” welcoming of all
churches for discussion and perhaps cooperation on a few issues of
mutual concern, like poverty and the environment.115 This larger “but
thinner” table, as Edgar describes it, includes voices from the entire
spectrum of theological beliefs, and, because CCT will act only upon
consensus, it is expected to be more of a dialoguing and relationship-
building vehicle than one that operates action programs. (Edgar de-
scribed its mission as helping Christians learn how to play in the
sandbox together.) Orthodox communions that have frequently op-
posed council liberalism have found council membership valuable
because it unites them in Christian dialogue with others.116
While some speculated that CCT might replace the NCC (as
has happened in some other nations that have developed CCT organi-
zations), this does not appear likely to NCC staff who still see a need
for its prophetic voice and bold advocacy on social and political jus-
tice issues. The NCC fills a niche desired by many of its more socially
active communions.117 Edgar does not feel it vital that the NCC reflect
the perspectives of laity, for “none of the prophets, none of the disci-
ples ever had a majority; none of them ever took a vote to figure out
what God’s will is.” It does not surprise him, either, “that there would
be a disconnect between prophetic lay and clergy leadership and the
general population.”118 He wants the NCC to function as a “chaplain
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of world opinion” and, in some respects, as a vital, visible counter-
force to the religious right’s current public dominance within Amer-
ica’s political culture.119 Even though Edgar made his political career
in the Democratic Party before joining the NCC, he hopes to reach out
to moderate Christians of both parties on issues of concern. The
smaller, leaner NCC sees as part of its raison d’être its ability to act
quickly and boldly on hot political issues that CWS and CCT cannot
and will not touch. Therefore, it is unlikely to change its process or
style of political action from the prophetic to the consultive-reflective
mode that CWS desires.
A New Ecumenical Model Emerges (the present)
American mainline ecumenism is evolving from the single
“umbrella” model popularized after World War II into a series of
smaller, overlapping, satellite organizations, each with its own ecu-
menical specialty. CCT is designed to operate as a facilitator of dia-
logue and serve as the broadest reflection of American Christianity.
CWS operates as the churches’ service and relief agency. The NCC
specializes in being the religious liberal gadfly on the political scene
as well as the organizer of ecumenical action on political crisis issues
too controversial for the other two. There is a fourth organization
called Churches Uniting in Christ (CUIC) that serves to enhance inter-
denominational relationships by bringing communions together in
mutual recognition of one another’s sacraments and clergy as well as
cooperation in common mission.120
Whether this new multicentered satellite model of American
mainline ecumenism will survive and thrive is speculative. The Rev-
erend John McCullough sees it as necessary for the time being; how-
ever, he also predicts that the separate satellites will need to move
more closely together in the future. Even though the whole notion of
bureaucratic national ecumenism has lost its sex appeal since the
1960s, it may be more necessary than ever. With mainline congrega-
tions aging, the need for denominations to pool resources to accom-
plish goals increases. At the same time, however, shrinking denomi-
national budgets have forced both the NCC and CWS to begin
seeking out new paying partners. These new partners, or constituents,
will bring their own binding expectations to the ecumenical table.121
In July 2003, at the writing of this essay, the relationship be-
tween the NCC and CWS is polite but strained due largely to the fact
that the divorce is not yet complete. Separation has been complex,
stressful, and phased in stages. The two still share a communications
department and a Washington office, along with answering to the
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same general assembly. Separation and/or redefinition of working
arrangements within each of these areas is expected in the future.122
Internationally, ecumenical bodies have found the NCC/CWS
separation confusing in terms of trying to determine which organiza-
tion to go to for what ends. This is due to the fact that the NCC and
CWS still struggle with some turf issues and anxieties. Whereas the
NCC fears that CWS wants to become “the council” in relationships
with international bodies, CWS fears that the NCC is still trying to
usurp its authority by speaking for it overseas.123 Exacerbating this
confusion is the fact that Edgar and McCullough have tended to
travel abroad independently of one another to meet with other ecu-
menical organizations.124 The impact of the separation and new satel-
lite model upon the health and vibrancy of global ecumenism has yet
to be revealed. The World Council of Churches continues to urge
other nations’ councils to “develop their links with the USA . . . rec-
ognizing the reality that what the US does affects the rest of the
world.”125
As the NCC and CWS work to shape their separate identities,
they both realize that new models of ecumenism are needed in the
twenty-first century; their separation is providing them with an op-
portunity to try new things. Both Edgar and McCullough are excited
about the future possibilities for their retooled organizations, and
each establishment seems healthier than it was in 2000. Recent studies
by Nancy Ammerman and others illustrate that religious institutions
find strength and lay support by maintaining distinct identities. Yet,
this is difficult for some ecumenists to swallow. Those rooted in the
conciliar tradition historically have longed for Christians to dissolve
the barriers that separate them, transcend cultural loyalties, put aside
self-interest, and function as a unified body of Christ. This vision had
inspired the creation of the World and National Councils of Churches.
Without this, some fear that real ecumenism is being lost.126 However,
as the NCC/CWS story reveals, ecumenical organizations have be-
come trapped within the political culture wars of the last forty years
through the priorities and beliefs of their constituents who provide
funds, credibility, and mandates to them. In order to function effec-
tively and preserve an established organizational identity, the “right
arm” (CWS) and “left arm” (NCC) of American mainline ecumenism
cannot easily rise above this reality and compromise in ways deemed
offensive to those constituents.127 Their structures also serve to dictate
what they can do as well as how they are perceived.
In spite of a mutual devotion to Christian unity, conflict
plagued the NCC/CWS relationship throughout most of its fifty-year
marriage. The fissures that appeared in the 1960s became the fault
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lines that precipitated their divorce. Ecumenical cooperation between
distinct religious organizations, able to maintain their own unique
identities, finances, and constituencies, ultimately may prove more
fruitful for all. It may also provide the flexibility to allow religious or-
ganizations to ride through America’s polarizing political periods
with the least amount of stress upon their relationships or institu-
tional health.
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ABSTRACT In 2000, after fifty years together, Church World Service and
the National Council of Churches separated their organizations. These two
ecumenical bodies, devoted to Christian unity, decided to do so after more
than thirty years of intra-organizational tension had evolved into irrecon-
cilable differences. This essay explores the long history of their troubled re-
lationship and illustrates how profoundly political culture affects religious
life and work. It asserts that the causes of their divorce were rooted in con-
stituent and structural differences that became especially problematic dur-
ing politically polarized eras. In spite of a mutual devotion to Christian
unity based upon the expectation that ecumenism requires transcendence
of worldly self interests, the NCC and CWS could not easily transcend the
political culture of their times nor the self interests of their constituents if
they wished to survive as organizations. Awareness of this reality is now a
factor in the reshaping of national ecumenical organizations in the United
States, which are moving more toward a multi-centered satellite model of
ecumenism. The NCC/CWS split is also part of a global trend, for councils
of churches and their service wings in several nations have been divorcing
in recent years. Due to the influence of American ecumenical organizations
internationally, the outcome of the NCC/CWS efforts to redefine them-
selves and their relationship will affect the future of ecumenism both
within and beyond America’s borders.
